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Kurzfassung
Vorbemerkung
In  Rußland  ist  die  demographische Situation  seit  vielen  Jahren  schwierig.  Sie  wird  heute  ge-
kennzeichnet durch anhaltenden Geburtenrückgang, der sich in den neunziger Jahren beschleunigt; 
steigende Indikatoren der Mortalität, besonders bei Männern im arbeitsfähigen Alter und bei den 
nicht  natürlichen  Todesursachen;  dauerhaft  hohe  Kindersterblichkeit,  die  weiter  ansteigt; 
zunehmende  Ehescheidungen  bei  rückläufigen  Eheschließungen;  steigende  Anzahl  der 
Alleinerziehenden, die gegenwärtig 4 Millionen Kinder versorgen; seit 1992  ist ein tatsächlicher 
Bevölkerungsrückgang zu beobachten, es sterben mehr Menschen als Kinder geboren werden.
Ergebnisse
Die auf eine geringe Kinderzahl gerichtete reproduktive Orientierung der überwiegenden Mehrheit 
der  Bevölkerung  wird  zunehmend  ungünstiger  beeinflußt  von  den  gegenwärtigen  sozio-
ökonomischen und politischen Verhältnissen.
Im Ural und in den nordöstlichen Gegenden Rußlands waren die auf die Reproduktion bezogenen 
Einstellungswerte am niedrigsten.
Der Bevölkerung wird bewußt, daß ohne radikale ökonomische Reformen und politische Stabilität 
kaum  Vertrauen  in  die  Zukunft  gewonnen werden kann  und  auch  keine  Aussichten bestehen, 
während der nächsten zwei oder drei Jahre genügend Einkommen für den Familienunterhalt und die 
Erfüllung eines Kinderwunsches zu erreichen.
Die Bevölkerung erwartet nicht, daß ihre Einstellung zur Realisierung von Kinderwünschen durch 
existierende  oder  vielleicht  zu  erwartende  staatliche  Hilfen  beeinflußt  werden  könnte.  In  der 
öffentlichen Meinung  drückt  sich  Angst  davor  aus,  die  wünschenswerte  und  den persönlichen 
Verhältnissen angemessene Kinderzahl zu bekommen, weil das Vertrauen in die Zukunft fehlt und 
ein ausreichendes Einkommen für Familien mit Kindern nicht gewährleistet ist.
Die unter den gegenwärtigen Verhältnissen gewährten staatlichen Hilfen für Familien mit Kindern 
sind  keine  Maßnahmen  einer  demographischen  Politik.  Es  handelt  sich  vielmehr  um 
Sozialhilfemaßnahmen, die lediglich auf die Gewährleistung des für das Überleben der Familien 
unumgänglichen Grundbedarfs gerichtet sind.
Zur  genaueren Ermittlung  der  Interessen der  Familien  mit  Kindern in  verschiedenen Bevölke-
rungsgruppen unter  den sich rapide ändernden Verhältnissen und zur  Erfassung allfälliger Ver-
änderungen der auf das reproduktive Verhalten bezogenen Einstellungen müßten Studien wie die 
hier vorliegende jährlich wiederholt werden.
I. The Demographic Problem
The  demographic  situation  in  Russia  has  long  presented  a  complicated  picture.  At  the 
present time, it is characterized by an accelerating decline in fertility in the nineties; a rise in 
the mortality indices, especially among men of working age and deaths of non-natural causes; 
stabilization of  infant mortality indices  at a high level;  a rise  in childbirth mortality; an 
increase in the number of divorces,  coupled with a drop in the number of marriages; an 
increase in the number of single parents, who are now rearing about 4 million children under 
age; an absolute reduction in population numbers in the country since 1992.
Evolution of Fertility
Over the last thirty years, the general trends in the fertility evolution in Russia were its slow decline 
and, later, stabilization at a low level; both processes were deformed by demographic waves, current 
economic as well as social factors, and demographic policy measures.
In the fifties, Russia recorded from 2.8 to 2.5 million births per year. In the period from 1960 to 
1968, the number of births fell sharply and, in 1968, there were slightly more than 1.8 million births. 
Then, fertility rose again slightly. Thus, in the second half of the seventies, the number of births was 
around 2.1 or 2.2 million per year. A new rise in fertility in the early eighties produced as many as 
2.5 million births in 1987 (the absolute maximum since 1961), before the present unparalleled drop 
in fertility took place.1 In 1991, there were 1.8 births; in 1992, 1.6; while in 1993, there were only 
1.4 births.2 This dramatic fall in the number of births in 1992 and 1993 was one of the main causes 
of the decline in the population during those years.
Certainly, in the nineties, this fall in the number of births was due to the decreasing numbers of 
women aged 20 to 30 (this age group accounts for as much as 70 percent of the total number of 
births per year). The curve for the number of births since 1987 repeated almost exactly the curve 
reflecting the number of women of this age group in the sixties (which, in turn, was, at least partly, 
an "echo" of the fertility during the Second World War period). Some displacement of the second 
curve was due to the fact that this was not the only cause of the decrease in the number of births. 
From 1989  to  1993,  the number of women in  the main  childbearing age group decreased by 
1,290,000  (12%), while the number of births decreased by 573,000  (27%). This means that, in 
addition to structural factors, a considerable part of the decrease in the number of births was due to a 
decline in the intensity of childbearing, i.e. to a decline in fertility itself. As to the dimensions of this 
decline, one can gain an idea of its magnitude on the basis of the evolution of the general fertility rate 
(average number  of  children born  per  woman).  Since the  middle of the  sixties,  this  has  been 
fluctuating around the level of 2.0.3
In the eighties, these fluctuations were at their widest. In 1979/80, the general fertility rate related to 
the entire population of Russia fell to its lowest level in all the post-war period (1.89); in 1986/87, it 
1 O polozhenii semei v Rossiiskoi  Federatsii  (The Situation of the Family in the Russian Federation). Moskva: 
Yuridicheskaya Literatura, 1994, p. 17.
2  Demograficheskii  ezhegodnik  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii  (Demographic  Yearbook  of  the  Russian  Federation). 
Moskva: Goskomstat Rossii. AO "Innomarket", 1994, p. 73.
3 O polozhenii ..., p. 17.
again fell sharply to 1.89. Subsequently, a further sharp drop took place: to 1.73 in 1991 and 1.55 in 
1992.4 At present, even in Western Europe, there are only few countries with a lower fertility level 
(Austria, Germany, Italy and Spain).
It should be noted that, since the second half of the sixties, population reproduction has been taking 
place in Russia at  or even below the replacement level; in urban areas, it  is already below the 
replacement level, while in rural areas it is still above. Nevertheless, even here it is rapidly turning to 
be below the replacement level.
Illegitimate Fertility
The fertility level in Russia is determined mainly by married couples. Nevertheless, some rise in 
illegitimate fertility is to be observed in recent years.
The evolution of the number of children born in and out of wedlock is not the same: from 1983 to 
1987, the total increase in the number of births amounted to 13.5%; in the same period, the number 
of children born in wedlock increased by 11.1%, while the number of those born out of wedlock 
grew by 33.6% (Dr.  G.A. Bondarskaya).  From 1987  to 1992,  the number of children born in 
wedlock decreased by 44.3%, while the number of those born out of wedlock dropped only by 
14.2%. In 1992, the number of births out of wedlock made up 17.2% of the total number of births.
Family Planning, Abortions
Even today, the main and the most easily accessible method of family planning in Russia remains  
the same: legal and illegal induced abortions. According to official data, both the absolute and  
the relative number of induced abortions is exhibiting a tendency to decline. Nevertheless, these  
estimates must be treated with caution, since it is very probable that, due to a number of causes,  
abortion records are rather incomplete. But even this understated information about the number  
of abortions still makes it possible to assert that Russia is still the absolute world leader in this  
field. In 1992, the official records registered 3.5 million induced abortions (98 per 1000 women 
of  15-49  years,  or  225  abortions  per  1000  live  births  and  stillbirths).5 In  the  Ukraine,  the 
corresponding indices are: 57 and 164; in Estonia, 64 and 117; in Hungary, 38 and 72; in Sweden, 
20 and 30; in France, 13 and 21; in the Netherlands, 5 and 20.6
Length of Life
The present period in the evolution of mortality and longevity in Russia started in the mid-sixties.  
Before that, there was a steady decline in mortality. In particular during a relatively short period  
from 1950 to the mid-sixties, infant mortality rates fell from 88 to 25 per 1000 births.7 The life 
expectancy at birth rose to 64 years for males and 73 years for females. Contrary to these trends, 
since 1964/65, instead of rising, the length of life began first to stagnate and then to fall, first of all in 
4 Demograficheskii ezhegodnik ..., p. 73.
5 O polozhenii, p. 21.
6 Ibid., p. 22.
7 Ibid.
the case of males. These trends were effective into the early eighties. The lowest level of length of life 
was reached in 1979/80: 61.5 years for males and 73 years for females. Even more, the length of life 
for the male population in rural areas fell to a level unparalleled in any developed country: 58 years 
(1977/78). This drop in life expectancy was related almost exclusively to the rise in mortality due to 
accidents, poisoning and trauma among young and middle-aged persons, as well as a mortality rise 
due to cardiovascular diseases.
At the beginning of the eighties, the fifteen-year trend towards lower life expectancy changed to one 
of slow rise. In 1985/87, this process gained some reinforcement and more strength as a result of the 
anti-alcohol campaign. In two years, the length of life grew by 2.6 years for males and by 1.2 years 
for females. Nevertheless, as early as in 1987, the decline in mortality ended and a tendency to return 
to the previous level (which had existed before 1985)  became evident. Since 1988,  the average 
length of life has been falling again, and this is still the present day reality. This drop in the length of 
the  life  was  especially  dramatic  in  1992:  the  male  population  lost  1.5  years  and  the  female 
population 0.5 years. In 1993 the length of life was 58.9 years for males and 71.9 for females.8 What 
is more, for many years the length of life in this country was the worst recorded in any economically 
developed country (the lowest of all in the case of males and one of the lowest for females). The 
decline in life expectancy was a result of rising mortality in a number of age groups, especially 
among young and middle-aged males. Mortality of the elder population was growing at a slower 
pace, while the general tendency of infant mortality was to go down slowly.
Infant Mortality
In the beginning, the rise in mortality was not common to all age groups, and, for instance, infant  
mortality continued to decline for some time; in 1990, it was 14% lower than in 1984.9 Contrary 
to this, the infant mortality level started to go up again as of 1991, both among the urban and among 
the rural population; in 1992, it was higher than in 1989: 18 deaths per 1000 births.10 Compared 
with present-day Western standards, the infant mortality level in Russia is very high. In order to 
appreciate the magnitude of the stagnation in this field in recent decennia, it would be useful to 
compare the evolution of infant mortality in Russia and in several Western countries.
The actual lag between the infant mortality level in Russia and in highly developed countries is even 
greater because of the different criteria applicable to the recording of newborn deaths. The 1993 
transition to adopting the universally recognized international criteria would give higher rates of 
infant mortality (20 to 25% higher, according to WHO estimates).
It is interesting to note that the 1993 infant mortality rise depends on exogenous causes of death, i.e. 
those that can be eliminated. On the basis of information from an eleven-month period in 1993 , as 
compared with the information from the corresponding period of the previous year,  mortality of 
newborn children due to infectious and parasitic diseases rose by up to 26%, while the figure for 
accidents was 21% higher and the figure for respiratory diseases was 20% higher.11
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Demograficheskii ezhegodnik ..., p. 224.
This is a symptom of a precarious situation in the very system of child protection, a symptom of a 
troublesome socio-economic and epidemiological situation, of a deteriorating system of child care 
and nutrition.
Even  so,  the  introduction  of  new criteria  for  recording  newborn  deaths  did  not  produce  any 
immediate increase in infant mortality figures. This means that the new recording system for vital 
statistics has not yet been introduced full scale. Since 1991, a new rise in mortality among children 
aged 0 to 14 has taken place. More than half of these died from trauma, accidents and poisoning.
In society, attention to demographic processes is growing; people are expressing anxiety about the 
future development of the country's population; forecasts of population numbers are constructed 
simply by extrapolating, without allowance for recent trends in the reproductive behaviour of the 
Russian population.
Since the demographic situation in the country is determined in the first instance by changes in 
fertility rates, in our opinion research into the population's reproductive tendencies is important with 
a  view  to  understanding  and  forecasting  fertility  in  the  country,  for  elaborating  a  long-term 
conception for demographic and family-oriented policy.
In the period 1990-1994, VCIOM has conducted a number of studies concerning the demographic 
problems of Russia and the former USSR with the aim of elucidating the reproductive orientations of 
Russia's population.12
II. Methods, Goals of the Surveys
The first survey on the reproductive orientations of the population was conducted in July 1991, the 
second in September-October 1992. In both surveys the sample totality was about 1,350 persons 
(1991 - N=1,314; 1992 - N=1,357). The third survey, the results of which are analyzed here, was 
conducted from late  March to  late  April  1994  among the  urban  and rural  populations of the 
following regions of Russia: Northern, North-Western, Central, Volga-Viatka, Central Black Earth, 
Volga, North Caucasian, Urals, West Siberian, and Far Eastern.
The 1991 survey was conducted under conditions when Russia was still a part of the USSR, six 
months before the beginning of the avalanche liberalization of prices for all  kinds of foodstuffs, 
industrial  goods, and services. The 1992  survey took place under conditions when the Russian 
population had already been feeling the pressure of price liberalization and inflation processes for 9 
months, with wage increases and the social protection of the most under-privileged groups of the 
population lagging behind. The survey conducted in March-April 1994 took place under conditions 
of further deterioration of the economic situation,and of the lag between the rise in family incomes 
and increasing prices for foodstuffs and everyday services, under conditions when a real threat of 
mass bankruptcy of enterprises and a corresponding rise in the scale of unemployment was emerging.
The aim of all three surveys was to ascertain the ideal, desired and expected number of children as 
11 Statisticheskii ezhegodnik Rossiiskoi Federatsii 1992 goda (The Statistical Yearbook of the Russian Federation 
in 1992). Moskva: Goskomstat Rossii, Respublikanskii Informatsionno - Izdatelskii Tsentr. 1993, p. 120.
12 The results are unpublished and stored in the VCIOM data pool "Reproductive Behaviour of Russia's population".
stated by different generations of people interviewed and to elucidate factors which, in people's eyes, 
favour or hinder convergence of the desired and actual numbers of children.
The level of the birth rate is ultimately determined by the number of children families have, which is 
a result of their reproductive behaviour. The number of children in a family is closely connected with 
value orientations, motivation for childbirth, stability of the marriage, choice of this or that scenario 
of reproductive behaviour under the influence of economic conditions, the work effort, financial and 
material resources required to maintain and bring up children in a family.
By controlling the number of its children, a contemporary family achieves the "economically rational 
number of children"*), i.e., a coordination between a certain number of children on the one hand and 
the consumer and productive interests of the household on the other, and preserves the objectively 
conditioned magnitude of expenditure on childbirth and rearing. The latter is called the price of 
equilibrium or the economically rational price of "child production".
A study of reproductive behaviour from the viewpoint of the so-called new economic theory of the 
family makes it possible to a certain extent to understand the trends of future changes in reproductive 
orientations by number of children and to identify possibilities for controlling the birth-rate by means 
of social, family or demographic pronatalistic policies.
Interviewing
The sampled totality was about 4,000 persons (N=3,776). The object of study - the population aged 
16 years and older. The sampled totality is representative of both the urban and the rural population. 
In each stratum, PSEUDO (urban settlements and rural districts) were selected with a probability 
proportional to the numbers of the adult population residing in them. In all, 121 sampling points 
were included in the sample (92 urban settlements and 29 rural districts). At the second stage of 
sampling, households were selected within the chosen settlements. The survey was carried out by 
random route sample. The route was randomly selected from a list of streets in a given settlement. At 
the third stage, the interviewer selected a  respondent of the nearest birthday within each chosen 
household. Interviewers visited each address up to 3 times. Personal face-to-face interviewing for this 
survey were conducted by trained interviewers at the respondent's home, 10-12 (in the last resort up 
to 15) interviews per interviewer. In all around 150 interviewers took part in the survey. 10 per cent 
of the questionnaires were checked by means of a callback or by telephone.
III. Results of the Study
The Population's Concepts of the Ideal, Desired, and Expected Number of Children
First, let us cite definitions of the concepts of ideal, desired, and expected number of children.
The ideal number of children is an individual notion of the best number of children in a family in 
general, without regard for any concrete life situation and personal preferences.
The desired number of children is the number of children that an individual would prefer to have in 
his/her family, proceeding from his/her own intentions, without regard for concrete circumstances of 
life and individual biography.
Though in real life the expected number of children in a family does not always coincide with the 
actual one, nevertheless the birth rate is to a considerable extent determined by the reproductive plans 
of  a  family  and  person,  which,  according  to  many  scholars,  remain  quite  stable  during  the 
reproductive period of life.
Table 1
The Dynamics of Indices of Ideal, Desired, and Expected Number of Children in 1991-1994
Number of children Total fertility-rate
Ideal Desirable Expected
1991 1992 1994 1991 1992 1994 1991 1992 1994 1991 1992 1993
Russia in 
general 2.10 1.53 2.02 2.25 1.96 1.65 1.77 1.33 1.08 1.73 1.55 1.4
Incl.
by gender:
Male 2.21 1.45 2.00 2.29 1.93 1.68 1.94 1.30 1.08
Female 2.02 1.59 2.04 2.22 1.99 1.63 1.68 1.41 1.08
The ideal number of children was ascertained from the answer to the question "Speaking about an 
"ideal family", what number of children do you think to be proper for one?" On the average for the 
totality  of people interviewed in  Russia  the answer was 2.02,  while for  males this index was 
somewhat lower than for females: 2.00 and 2.04 respectively. Another correlation is noted in the 
indices of the desired and expected number of children: the indices of the desired number of children 
are somewhat higher for males than for females: 1.68 and 1.63 respectively. The indices for the 
expected number of children are equal for both males and females (1.08 and 1.09 respectively).
Respondents' answers to the question about the ideal number of children in a family make it possible 
to discuss, first of all, their concept of the social norm for the number of children.
Somewhat more concrete characteristics of the reproductive preferences of a  respondent can be 
obtained from the  desired  number  of  children (in  reply  to  the  question "How many children, 
including those already born, do you want to have, providing all necessary conditions are met?"). In 
this survey this index turned out to be lower than the ideal number of children at an average, for the 
totality of those interviewed in Russia, of 1.65, being 1.63 for females, and 1.68 for males.
The most concrete index (and, obviously, the most acceptable for forecasting) is that of the expected 
number of children. In the 1994 survey, this was, on an all- Russia average, 1.08: 1.08 for males and 
1.09 for females. During the period 1991-1994, it decreased from 1.77 to 1.08, i.e., by almost 40% 
(see Table 1). In essence, the index of the expected number of children in 1994 was 2 times lower 
than the replacement level of reproduction of generations.
Reproductive orientations are differentiated depending on various socio-demographic characteristics.
The  data  of the survey,  "Reproductive Behaviour,  1994",  enable us  (with  a  certain  degree of 
conditionality) to judge the change in reproductive behaviour at transitions from one generation to 
another.
Reproductive Orientation by Age and Sex
Based on the results of this survey, the index of the ideal number of children for respondents of age 
under 29 years differs slightly from the notion of the ideal number of children in a population aged 
from 30 to 49 years: 2.16 and 2.22, respectively. At older ages (50 years and over), the proportion of 
respondents who think three children to be an the ideal number of children in a family is 10 points 
higher by comparison with respondents aged 30-49 years, and the average ideal number of children 
was 2.43. The analysis of populations' notions by sex/age gives grounds to conclude that the social 
norm for the number of children, while remaining low for the population as a whole, tends to indicate 
a convergence of the reproductive behaviour of the young, middle, and elderly generations, while no 
significant differences are observed between females and males (2.00 and 2.04, respectively).
Reproductive Orientation by Marital Status
Reproductive orientations as a function of marital status show the greatest differences between two 
population groups: the single and the married. Differences in the index of desired number of children 
are significant: unmarried people wished to have slightly more than one child (1.29),  while the 
desired number of children for married respondents is closer to two children (1.79).
Respondents considering themselves divorced take an intermediate position between the two first 
groups (see Table 2).
Table 2
Population's opinions on the ideal, desired, and expected number of children. Russia, 1994
Number of children
Ideal Desired Expected
Total 2.02 1.65 1.08
Incl.:
By marital status:
Single 1.72 1.29 0.89
Married 2.10 1.79 1.21
Divorced 2.03 1.70 0.97
Widowed 2.02 1.26 0.77
Reproductive Orientation by Number of Children
Another demographic characteristic influencing the differentiation in the population's notions of 
reproductive behaviour is constituted by the presence of children in a respondent's family and their 
number: the lower the number of a respondent's children, the lower the indices of the ideal, desired, 
and expected number of children (see Table 3).
Table 3
Population's opinion on the ideal, desired, and expected number of children. Russia, 1994
Number of children
Ideal Desired Expected
Total 2.02 1.65 1.08
Incl.:
By number of children:
1 1.98 1.74 1.17
2 2.14 1.98 1.41
3 and more 2.94 2.80 1.85
Among respondents having one child, 60 percent consider two children in a family the ideal number, 
18 percent think it to be three children. Among respondents having two children, 55 percent call two 
children the ideal  number,  and  25  percent say  this  is  three children;  of the  interviewees who 
themselves have three or more children, one fifth call two children the ideal number, and one ninth 
say five or more children are ideal.
Reproductive Orientation by Level of Education
One of the social characteristics is the population's level of education. Differentiation as a function of 
the  education  level  of  the  respondent  varies  for  the  different  characteristics  of  reproductive 
orientation. Let us review the indices for two groups of the population: those with higher and those 
with only secondary education. The size of this index is 1.88 and 1.72, respectively. The desired 
number of children among people with higher education was somewhat higher than that among 
people with secondary education.
We are probably dealing with an exaggerated index of the desired number of children. As to the 
"ideal number of children" index, it is considerably higher for people with secondary education than 
for people with higher education (2.02 and 1.16, respectively), (see Table 4).
Table 4
Population's opinion on the ideal, desired, and expected number of children. Russia, 1994
Number of children
Ideal Desired Expected
Total 2.02 1.65 1.08
Incl.:
By gender:
Male 2.00 1.68 1.08
Female 2.04 1.63 1.09
By age:
Under 29 years 2.16 1.70 1.18
30-49 years 2.22 1.85 1.22
50 years and older 2.43 1.35 0.85
By education:
Higher/Non-completed higher 1.16 1.88 1.25
Secondary/Secondary special 2.02 1.72 1.17
Below secondary 1.97 1.47 1.00
By marital status:
Single 1.72 1.29 0.89
Maried 2.10 1.79 1.21
Divorced 2.03 1.70 0.97
Widowed 2.02 1.26 0.77
By ethnicity:
Russian 2.02 1.62 1.09
Native ethnicity 2.06 1.93 1.03
Other 2.12 1.88 1.06
By number of children:
1 1.98 1.74 1.17
2 2.14 1.98 1.41
3 and more 2.94 2.80 1.85
Reproductive Orientation by Types of Settlement and Region
Reproductive  orientations  also  differ  depending  on  the  type  of  settlement  and  region  where 
respondents live. Take for example four types of settlement:
1) Moscow and St. Petersburg
2) Big cities
3) District towns
4) Rural settlements
Three years ago, in the 1991 survey, there was still some regularity: indices of the ideal, desired, and 
expected numbers of children rose with growing distance from a capital city and towards rural 
settlements. In 1994, respondents in Moscow and St.Petersburg voted for higher norms for the 
number of children, even by comparison with respondents living in the countryside. What can 
this testify to? First of all, to the fact that residents of capital cities, though actually having a low 
number of children, wish under ideal circumstances to have higher norms for the number of 
children; secondly, that the reproductive behaviour of the rural population continues to approach 
the reproductive behaviour of urban residents.
It  is  a  new feature  in  the  reproductive behaviour  that  all  the  indices under  examination have 
decreased for respondents living in big cities and towns at the district level (see Table 5).
Table 5
Population's opinions on the ideal, desirable,and expected number of children. Russia, 1994
Number of children
Ideal Desired Expected
Total 2.02 1.65 1.08
Incl.:
By type of settlement:
Moscow and
St. Petersburg 2.14 1.84 1.28
Big cities 1.96 1.54 1.05
District towns 2.02 1.58 1.02
Rural settlements 2.05 1.77 1.17
The region of residence is of significant importance to differences in the population's opinions on the 
ideal, desired, and expected number of children. The lowest indices are obtained for respondents 
living in the North Western region of Russia and in the Urals, which correlates with the actual birth-
rate levels in these regions. The maximum values for all three indices are given by respondents living 
in the North Caucasian region. In the expected number of children category, the index for the Urals 
region (0.78) is half of that for the North Caucasian region (1.60), but in the latter as well, the index 
of the desired number of children does not attain the level necessary for assuring at least elementary 
reproduction of the population (see Table 6).
Table 6
Population's opinions on the ideal, desirable, and expected number of children, depending on the 
region of dwelling. Russia, 1994
North North 
West
Central Volga-
Viatka
Central 
Black Earth
Volga North 
Caucasus
Ural West 
Siberia
Far 
East
Ideal number of 
children 2.0 1.83 1.99 1.97 2.26 2.04 2.19 1.98 1.96 2.06
Desired number of 
children 1.66 1.59 1.81 1.54 1.52 1.43 2.03 1.43 1.40 2.01
Expected number of 
children 0.90 0.88 1.41 1.19 1.03 0.88 1.60 0.78 0.88 1.05
Actual 2.07 1.69 1.64 1.74 1.96 1.72 1.95 1.94 1.91 2.08
Are you going to have at least one child 
born within the coming 2 or 3 years?
Yes 5.4 5.1 4.6 7.3 1.9 3.9 3.7 4.5 3.7 6.9
More likely yes 3.1 2.5 3.8 0.7 6.9 1.9 4.0 4.6 1.5 1.9
More likely no 3.4 6.9 5.8 4.9 8.6 3.7 5.4 5.5 1.9 2.9
No 67.9 76.6 66.8 76.5 65.3 69.7 76.9 74.3 78.9 79.1
Hard to answer 20.2 8.8 19.0 10.6 17.3 20.8 10.0 11.2 14.0 9.2
If you (or your wife) have an unplanned 
pregnancy in your family life, what 
would you most likely do: to give birth 
to the child or break the pregnancy?
Give birth to the child 18.9 8.2 16.9 8.8 12.6 9.6 13.5 8.4 12.2 16.8
Break pregnancy 43.8 46.7 35.1 44.0 31.0 33.9 36.3 50.9 41.6 43.9
Hard to answer 37.3 45.2 48.0 47.3 56.4 56.5 50.2 40.6 46.2 39.3
Reproductive Orientation by Religion
Last but not least, there is one greatly important characteristic of the population: attitude towards 
religion and religious denomination.
In the survey, the questions "Do you believe in God?" and "What is your religion?" were asked. All 
those who consider themselves believers were registered as believers.*)
In the 1991 survey which embraced the population of the former USSR, a considerable difference 
was observed between the reproductive attitudes of respondents professing the Orthodox and those 
professing the Moslem faith. The 1994 survey, which covered only the population of Russia, did not 
expose significant differences, except in the index for the desired number of children (Orthodox - 
1.66, Moslems - 2.34).
Reproductive "Plans"
Reproductive behaviour can be subject to  change on various grounds at  different stages of the 
individual's life cycle; for this reason, the respondents' more immediate plans concerning childbirth 
were determined using the question "Are you going to have at least one more child within the next 2 
or 3 years?"
* ) In the opinion of those people who go to church and acknowledge the teachings of the church, there are 
great  differences  in  reproductive behaviour  between  true  believers  and  those  who only  consider  themselves 
believers. Our results deal only with those who rank themselves among believers. It is important to bear this in 
mind when interpreting the survey's results.
On the average over the whole of Russia, only 4.5% of respondents answered "Yes", including 5% 
among  males  and  4%  among females;  affirmative  answers by  married  and  unmarried  people 
coincide, being 6% in both groups; among believers they are about 4% and among non-believers - 
5.6%. Less than 2% (the lowest index in all the regions of Russia) are going to have another child in 
the Central Black Earth region of Russia and the highest percentage of "No" (about 8%) is in the Far 
East and Western Siberia.
A cause of special concern is, in our opinion, the firm resolution by three-quarters of respondents 
among the rural population not to have any more children in the coming 2 or 3 years.
Among young people under 29, the number of those who wished to have a child within the coming 2 
or 3 years is at its greatest, but the proportion of these does not exceed 13 per cent of the number of 
all those who gave answers and is exceeded three times over by the proportion of respondents within 
this age group who do not think it possible for themselves to have a child within the coming several 
years (see Table 7).
Table 7
Answers to question "Are you (and your wife) going to have at least one more child born within the 
coming 2 or 3 years (besides those already born)? Russia, 1994
(Percent of those who gave answers)
Yes More likely yes More likely no No Hard to answer
Total: 4.5 3.1 4.7 73.1 14.5
Incl.
By age:
> 29 years 13.4 8.3 9.3 41.4 7.2
30-49 years 2.5 2.4 5.6 82.4 7.2
50 years and older 0.0 0.0 0.0 86.4 13.7
By social status and 
occupation:
Managers 6.5 5.0 6.9 72.5 9.2
Specialists 7.6 6.4 7.5 68.6 10.0
Employees 5.9 2.9 3.7 75.9 11.7
Skilled blue-collar 
workers 5.3 3.5 5.1 74.7 11.4
Unskilled workers 3.0 1.6 4.5 74.8 16.1
By gender:
Male 5.3 3.4 4.5 69.9 16.9
Female 3.9 2.9 4.9 75.9 12.5
By marital status:
Single 5.7 2.3 3.0 48.9 40.1
Married 5.0 3.8 5.9 77.9 7.5
Divorced 2.3 3.1 2.4 77.7 14.5
Widowed 0.1 0.8 0.9 79.9 18.5
In their resolute "No" to childbirth, respondents express their attitudes towards the difficulties of 
present-day socioeconomic and political life in the country.
This intention may ultimately lead to de facto refusal on the part of some families to have any more 
children  (more  accurately,  one  should  speak,  initially,  of  refusal  to  have  a  second,  third  or 
subsequent child, but not of refusal to have a first child).
Attitudes to Unplanned Pregnancies and Abortion
The following question served as an additional check on the reproductive intentions of respondents: 
"If you (or your wife) have an unplanned pregnancy in your family life, what would you most likely 
do?" On the average over the whole of Russia, the answers were distributed as follows: "Would give 
birth to the child" - 12.6%, "Would terminate the pregnancy" - 40%, "Hard to answer" - 47.3%.
Since four-fifths of all  pregnancies nowadays involve women aged under 29,  the correlation of 
answers at 1:3 in favour of abortion coincides with answers of respondents aged under 29 to the 
preceding question, i.e. that they do not think it possible for them to have another child in the coming 
2 or 3 years. In the age group up to 49  years, the proportion of respondents willing to prevent 
childbirth increases twofold.
The answers about abortion were not influenced by respondents' ethnicity; readiness to use this 
method is frequently mentioned by residents of the Urals and North West of Russia,  where re-
productive attitude indices are the lowest. A comparative analysis of the results of the 1991 and 
1994 surveys shows that the proportion of those willing to go ahead with a pregnancy has dropped 
by almost half (from 23 to 12.6%).
The 1994 survey reveals that family planning through abortion has reached the same level in the 
countryside as in the capital cities: 41 and 40 per cent, respectively (see Table 8).
Table 8
The ideal, desired and expected number of children depending on the type of settlement. Russia, 
1994
Moscow &
St. Petersburg
Big towns Small towns Villages
Ideal number of children 2.14 1.96 2.02 2.05
Desired number of children 1.84 1.54 1.58 1.77
Expected number of children 1.28 1.05 1.02 1.17
Actual 1.58 1.69 1.89 2.02
Are you  going to  have at  least  one  more 
child born within the coming 2 or 3 years?
Yes 6.37 4.36 4.30 4.44
More likely yes 3.97 3.69 3.18 2.28
More likely no 6.36 5.62 4.08 4.30
No 65.79 69.29 75.88 75.09
Hard to answer 17.50 17.04 12.55 13.90
If you (your wife) have an unplanned preg-
nancy in your family life, what would you 
most likely do: to give birth to the child or 
break the pregnancy?
Give birth to the child 17.45 14.84 10.17 12.19
Break the pregnancy 39.67 37.43 41.69 41.13
Hard to answer 42.89 47.73 48.14 46.68
The 1994 survey also indicates that a large number of people cannot give a definite answer: 51 per 
cent among the orthodox and 71 per cent among Moslems found it difficult to say what they would 
do in the case of an unplanned pregnancy. (See Table 9).
Table 9
Reproductive attitudes depending on confession. Russia, 1994
Orthodox Moslem Believers Non-believers
Ideal number of children 2.05 2.11 2.05 2.03
Desired number of children 1.66 2.34 1.7 1.6
Expected number of children 1.12 1.27 1.12 1.27
Actual 1.57 2.45 184 1.84
Are you going to have at least one more 
child born within the coming 2 or 3 years?
Yes 3.64 2.75 3.74 5.60
More likely yes 2.93 2.16 2.77 3.58
More likely no 5.09 3.99 4.93 4.23
No 73.88 79.71 74.09 71.44
Hard to answer 14.46 11.40 14.47 15.16
If you (your wife) have an unplanned preg-
nancy in your family life, what would you 
most likely do: to give birth to the child or 
break the pregnancy?
Give birth to the child 13.16 10.73 13.41 12.11
Break pregnancy 35.66 18.51 34.95 43.84
Hard to answer 51.18 70.75 51.64 44.05
Socioeconomic Factors of Reproductive Behaviour
As noted  by  scholars  of  the  population's  reproductive  behaviour,  reproductive  attitudes  are  
determined to a greater extent by value orientations than by other factors. Nevertheless, attitudes  
to the  number of  children  at any  concrete  moment  are  influenced  by  the population's  living  
conditions,  though  this  impact  realizes  itself  not  in  a  direct  way  but  through  a  subjective  
evaluation of the material conditions of the family's life. In the survey, the population's opinions  
concerning both common factors forming the material conditions and more particular attitudes  
picturing  the  objective  characteristics  of  the  conditions  of  a  family's  life  were  investigated.  
Answers to the question "What could now primarily help increase the number of  children  in  
families like yours?" help us to understand what problems are most significant to a family from 
the viewpoint of reproductive attitudes. Confidence in the future is the number one problem in  
our unstable times. The second problem, following the first with only an insignificant gap, is how  
to ameliorate the material situation of the family by creating possibilities to earn as much as  
necessary to maintain the family (40 per cent of those who gave answers). By now, every second  
respondent aged under 49, irrespective of sex, holds the same opinion.
In third place on the problem scale respondents place the need for a significant amelioration in  
housing conditions, this problem being twice as acute in the larger cities as in the countryside.  
The  population  realizes  that,  in  order  to  solve  the  family's  private  problems,  the  economic  
situation in general must first be improved (4th place).
No significant mention was made of the usual complex of state assistance measures to families,  
even  under  conditions  of a deterioration in the material  situation in 1994 as compared with  
1991: 8 percent of respondents were in favour of extending paid maternity leave; 14 per cent  
advocated the introduction of significant bonus payments on the birth of a child; 18 per cent  
voted for introduction of monthly allowances for children until the age of 16, with white-collar  
employees  (23%) and unskilled  manual  workers (22%) more frequently  calling  for the intro-
duction of this measure of assistance to families. We may conclude that the population is more  
willing to act in the direction of self-support than to rely on state assistance, though it does not  
reject such help from the state.
In the opinion of 13 percent of those who gave answers, nothing under the present conditions  
can favour an increase in the number of children in a family.
In order to clarify what socio-demographic conditions may favour childbirth in a family, not in  
general but within the coming 2 or 3 years, the question was asked "What can primarily help  
your decision to give birth to at least one child within the coming 2 or 3 years?". 
Every  fifth  respondent  is convinced  that his/her  decision  cannot  be  affected  by any  external  
conditions, the decision to have a child being firm. The same number of respondents (19.5%)  
would be willing to have a child in the near term given conditions of confidence in the future and  
good earnings (17.5%). By comparison with 1991, the threat of unemployment has risen in 1994,  
and almost 7 per cent of respondents connect their unwillingness to have a child with uncertainty  
about their jobs, young people under 29 years expressing this opionion 1.5 times more frequently  
than the population in general.
More state assistance to families takes only fifth place as a factor stimulating the decision to in-
crease the number of children, following the perceived need for a reduction in the rate of food  
price increases.
Thus, at the present stage, economic factors are, in the respondents' opinion, the decisive ele-
ment in the realization of a family's need for children.
In this report we do not dwell on behavioural access that, in our opinion, enables us to under-
stand more deeply why families with similar living conditions have different numbers of children,  
different stability of marriage, different desired and expected numbers of children in the family;  
neither do we consider the population's orientation in terms of family and extra-family values  
since these questions were not asked of the respondents because of financial limitations.
To conclude, we should note the fact that the present stage in Russia's development is charac-
terized by increasing vulnerability of families, and still less liberty in the realization of one of the  
family's principal functions, i.e. the reproductive function.
IV. Is a Demographic Policy Necessary?
To investigate the population's opinion on the necessity of a demographic policy concerning  
the birth rate, the question was asked: "Do you think that some urgent measures should now 
be undertaken in Russia to regulate the birth rate?"
More than half of those interviewed (54.6%) voted for urgent measures directed towards in-
creasing the birth rate, almost one out of five (19.5%) thinks that everything should stay as it is,  
and  almost  2  per  cent  were  in favour  of  a  decrease  in the birth rate,  while  every  fourth  
respondent found it difficult to answer this question.
Public opinion calls for urgent measures to raise the birth rate, both in the big cities (63%) and  
in the rural  settlements  (50%);  more  often  these  opinions are  voiced  by  the  married  and  
divorced than by the unmarried, both males (53%) and females (36%).
Among the 1.7 per cent of respondents who see a need to lower the birth rate, there are twice as  
many males as females, young people under 29 and single, villagers 2 times more frequently  
than citizens living in Moscow and St. Petersburg.
V. Principal Conclusions
1. The results of the study have shown that the low reproductive orientations typical of the  
overwhelming majority of Russia's population are being aggravated by peculiarities of the  
present socioeconomic and political situation of the country.
2. The lowest  indices  of  reproductive  attitudes  are  found in the Urals  and North Eastern  
region of Russia.
3. The population realizes that without radical economic reform and political stability it is dif-
ficult to  gain confidence  in the future and to  perceive  opportunities  to  earn enough to  
maintain a family with children and to plan having children within the coming two or three  
years.
4. The population does not consider the complex of family benefits, whether actually existing 
or  which could potentially  be offered  by  the government,  to  be  effective  with a view to  
changing the population's reproductive attitudes.
5. Public opinion expresses fear of actually having the desired and expected number of chil-
dren because of lack of confidence in the future and the inability to earn enough to main-
tain a family with children.
6. Under the existing conditions, it is obviously impossible to consider the material benefits  
granted by the state to be measures of demographic policy. They are instead to be viewed as  
family-assistance  policy  measures  oriented  towards  the  basic  survival  of  families  with 
children.
7. In order to know the exact interests of various groups of families with children under rap-
idly changing conditions and to keep in touch with reproductive attitudes, it would be nec-
essary to conduct monitoring studies on an annual basis.
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Summary
Introductory Remarks
The demographic situation in Russia has long presented a complicated picture. At the present  
time, it is characterized by an accelerating decline in fertility in the nineties; a rise in the mor-
tality indices, especially among men of working age and deaths of non-natural causes; stabili-
zation of infant mortality indices at a high level; a rise in childbirth mortality; an increase in  
the number of divorces, coupled with a drop in the number of marriages; an increase in the  
number  of  single  parents,  who  are  now rearing  about  4  million  children  under  age;  an  
absolute reduction in population numbers in the country since 1992.
Findings
The results of the study "Reproductive behaviour of Russia's Population" 1994 show that the  
low reproductive orientations typical of the overwhelming majority of Russia's population are  
being aggravated by peculiarities of the present socioeconomic and political situation of the  
country.
The lowest indices of reproductive attitudes are found in the Urals and North Eastern region of  
Russia.
The  population  realizes  that  without  radical  economic  reform  and  political  stability  it  is  
difficult  to  gain confidence  in the  future and to  perceive  opportunities  to  earn enough to  
maintain a family with children and to plan having children within the coming two or three  
years.
The population does not consider the complex of family benefits, whether actually existing or  
which could potentially be offered by the government, to be effective with a view to changing  
the population's reproductive attitudes.
Public opinion expresses fear of actually having the desired and expected number of children 
because of lack of confidence in the future and the inability to earn enough to maintain a  
family with children.
Under  the  existing  conditions,  it  is  obviously  impossible  to  consider  the  material  benefits  
granted by the state to be measures of demographic policy. They are instead to be viewed as  
family-assistance policy measures oriented towards the basic survival of families with children.
In order to know the exact interests of various groups of families with children under rapidly  
changing conditions and to keep in touch with reproductive attitudes, it would be necessary to  
conduct monitoring studies on an annual basis.
